Customary versus Civil Law within Old Regime France by Le Bris, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Customary versus Civil Law within Old
Regime France
David Le Bris
2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52976/
MPRA Paper No. 52976, posted 19. January 2014 17:12 UTC
1 
 
Customary versus Civil Law within Old Regime France 
 
 
David Le Bris 
KEDGE Business School1 
 
 
 
First version June 2013 
This version January 2014  
Comments welcome 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
Law and finance theory emphasizes the negative consequences of civil law on financial and, 
subsequently, economic development. Before the Revolution, French territory was strictly divided 
according to the legal regime. Since the Middle-Ages, the southern part of France was under 
Justinian civil law and the north was under customary laws which, as with common law, gave more 
flexibility to judges and less right to the state. This dichotomy offers the unique opportunity to test 
the law and finance theory free from cross-country bias. Using fiscal revenues across 79 Departments 
from 1817-1821, we test if Departments under civil law, over the centuries and up to 15 years ago, 
exhibit lower financial and economic outcomes. We find that civil law Departments do exhibit lower 
economic performances but this difference is not robust when controlled for fundamental factors. 
The civil law appears even to have a positive effect in many specifications. Old Regime France does 
not confirm the law and finance theory. 
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Introduction 
What are the causes of the large differences observed in the living standards across human 
communities? Law and finance theory (also called legal origin theory) proposes an attractive answer 
to this fundamental question by focusing on the legal origin (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 2000, 
hereafter LLSV). The first part of this theory is that financial development achieved in one country 
depends on the enforcement of private property rights, support of private contractual arrangements, 
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and protections of the legal right of investors. Second, the legal origin theory assumes that the legal 
tradition has a long-term impact on the attainment of these institutional qualities. Thus, the legal 
origin theory assumes that legal tradition provides an explanation for current financial development. 
The main claim of this theory is the superiority of common law compared to civil law in fostering 
financial development. Furthermore, financial development is proved to promote economic growth 
(see a survey in Pasali, 2013). This promotion of economic growth by financial development brings an 
additional causal relationship: the legal tradition helps to explain current economic development. 
This appealing theory remains highly discussed. Xu (2011) reports 15 articles of LLSV and 17 articles 
applying the methodology of LLSV supporting their conclusions and 17 articles and one book 
doubting their theory. 
The present paper uses an original empirical field to test this theory. Law and finance studies present 
France as the model and source of the most frequent civil law regimes. This claim is true after the 
Revolution but arguably false during the Old Regime, at which time France was strictly divided in two 
parts. The south part was called, the “written law countries” (pays de droit écrit), and was under 
Roman law, namely the code of Justinian (Corpus iuris civilis). The northern part of France was under 
several customary laws (pays de droit coutumier) which are close to English common law. This 
dichotomy within Old Regime France provides similar opposition to the one tested by the law and 
finance literature between common and civil law countries in contemporaneous time.  
Law and finance theory emphasizes two channels through which legal origin influences financial 
development and then economic outcomes (see Beck et al., 2003). First, the “political” channel 
contends that (a) legal traditions differ in terms of the priority that they attach to private property 
rights versus the rights of the State and (b) the protection of private contracting rights forms the 
basis of financial development (LLSV, 1999). English common law evolved to protect private property 
owners against the crown, whereas civil law provides a tool for state-control (La Porta et al., 2008). 
Second, the “adaptability” channel which stresses that (a) legal traditions differ in their ability to 
evolve with changing economic conditions (Hayek, 1960) and (b) legal traditions that adapt quickly to 
minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system’s capabilities 
will more effectively foster financial development than more rigid legal traditions. The judge-made 
law principle of common law is more efficient in adapting the law to new economic needs than the 
codes of the civil law regimes. 
These theoretical mechanisms hold for Old Regime France. A “political” channel existed allowing the 
state to intervene more readily in the southern part of the country. Indeed, the French state could 
use the role conferred to the Roman Emperor by the Justinian code to gain rights whereas this way 
did not exist in the customary part of the country. The French king used the Caesarism of the 
Justinian text, placing the emperor above the law saying “the king is emperor in his kingdom” to fight 
against feudalism (Chénon, 1929, vol. 0, p. 507). The “adaptability” channel is also verified since in 
the civil law part of the country, the judge must refer to the corpus iuris civilis whereas he 
beneficiates from greater freedom in the customary area. In this part of France, it is forbidden for a 
judge to refer to the Roman codes in order to make decisions. As for modern common law, we can 
suspect the customary legal regime of northern France to have offered superior adaptability to social 
and economic needs. As in common law, the main source of law is the cases judged in customary 
France whereas in the civil law area, the law had been written in Constantinople during the 6th 
century. 
3 
 
The need for legal solutions in the Old Regime economy was just as crucial as those of more recent 
periods. Firstly, the 17th and 18th centuries spanned a period of great economic changes, including 
changes in farming methods. New farming methods required the clarification of property rights 
concerning the usage rights of the village communities (North and Thomas, 1973). In addition, the 
period saw the birth of large firms (manufactures), Atlantic trade (Acemoglu et al., 2005) and new 
financial tools (Hoffman et al., 2001). Secondly, the credit market of Old Regime France was well-
developed and multiform. Today, the quality of legal rules influences savers to be more or less willing 
to invest. This is also the case during Old Regime France even if some of the then current legal rules 
known to play a role, for instance the protection of share-holders, do not make sense. Legal 
differences within Old Regime France lead to various practices on the credit market with clearly 
observable north/south differences (Hoffman et al., 2004). Thirdly, before the Revolution, the legal 
system was the result of about eight centuries of accumulated rules and contracts originally based on 
feudality, whereas the social system had evolved, making necessary legal adaptations along the way. 
We test the prediction of higher financial and thus economic development in the customary area 
compared to civil law part of France. According to legal origin theory, the civil law area, compared to 
the customary area, suffered centuries of legal institutions that upset financial development. The 
centuries of comparatively higher financial development in the customary area should have allowed 
a higher level of economic growth and thus better economic performance. We use data of the period 
following the end of the Napoleonic era (1817-1821). If the legal context is crucial enough to affect 
strongly the economic outcomes, it should still be observable 13 years after the introduction of a 
common legal system: the Code Civil in 1804.  
With the Revolution, France was divided in 86 Departments (Départements) from which 48 were 
previously under customary law, 31 under civil law and 7 partially under the two legal systems. To 
measure economic outcomes, we use fiscal and census data: TAX paid per capita and the number of 
DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita. To assess financial development, we measure the amount of 
CONTRACTS per capita using a tax paid on all notarized transactions (droits d’enregistrement) mainly 
real estate transactions and loans. For simplicity, we use the term “economic development” to refer 
to each of these three measures. We use the census of 1822 to gain a measure of inhabitants per 
Department, to convert these three measures into per capita figures. In 1817, two years after the 
end of the Napoleonic Empire, the economic and administrative situation was stable enough to allow 
significant measures. We use an average over 1817-1821 to smooth exceptional local variations due 
to, for example, a bad crop yield. We use a variety of variables to control for fundamental factors 
explaining differences in economic development across France. 
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze and test law and finance theory on a single country 
sample rather than the typical international comparisons, bringing new data to bear on a hot issue. 
Our empirical field offers three categories of advantages. First, compared to international tests of 
legal origin theory, this within France analysis allows us to escape several potential other factors. 
International comparisons are notoriously plagued by the difficulty of netting out the effects of other 
fundamental causes of economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2005). Recent research highlights 
several explanations for economic development, from which this paper is forearmed, such as the 
English and Protestant culture (Stulz and Williamson, 2003), conditions of transplantation of the legal 
regime (Acemoglu et al., 2001), effects of very long-term history, such as the state of technologies 
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centuries ago (Comin et al., 2010), the birth of a state (Bockstette et al., 2002)2, year 1500 origin of 
current population (Putterman and Weil, 2010), the level of genetic diversity (Ashraf and Galor, 
2013) and share of European population (Easterly and Levine, 2012). 
Second, our period of analysis avoids the heterogeneous structural effects of the industrial 
Revolution. Our observations are free from the effect of the presence of coal and iron mines, which 
will provide large advantages to several locations in the following decades (Pomeranz, 2000). It is 
also before the railways, which could at the same time be a consequence of previous economic 
development (the railways are designed to serve the richest part of the population) and bring large 
advantages to the future development of areas served. Third, our measures of economic outcomes 
can be compared without any serious doubt since they come from a homogeneous fiscal system and 
reliable census data. 
Customary law Departments exhibit a significantly higher economic development but fundamental 
factors also need to be controlled for. Several exogenous factors are identified to explain the 
economic development of a Department. The number of kilometers of navigable rivers and the 
historical presence of a Parliament in a Department are favorable to economic development, 
whereas a high average altitude, the quantity of rain, the distance from Paris, and the distance from 
the closest university lead to weaker economic development. After control for one or several of 
these fundamental factors, the higher economic development of the customary part of the country 
disappears. Worst, the first prediction of the legal origin theory, i.e. a higher financial development, 
is not verified since civil law Departments show a higher amount of CONTRACTS per capita after 
control for either fundamental factors or the general level of development.  
This study is organized as follows. The next section details the historical background of the two 
French legal regimes. Section 2 explains the data we use. Section 3 measures the higher economic 
development of the customary area. Section 4 rejects the legal explanation after control for 
fundamental factors in Section 4. Section 5 focuses on the financial development in the civil law area. 
Section 6 provides several tests of robustness for the rejection. The last section concludes.  
 
1. Historical background 
Old Regime France, legal dichotomy and diversity 
Despite the gradual expansion of the kingdom of France, existing local laws remained in force up to 
1789. Voltaire mocked France’s fragmented pre-Revolution legal system by writing, “When you travel 
in this Kingdom, you change legal systems as often as you change horses.” (in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 2003).3 Indeed, about 80 general customs and 380 local customs were in force within the 
Old Regime France. These various legal regimes were applied by several forms of court and not only a 
royal justice; the decline of feudal and municipal justice was only gradual (Chénon, 1929, vol. I, p. 
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491).4 There was sometimes up to four levels of courts of appeal (Chénon, 1929 vol. 0, p. 886). Even 
for last resort cases, 14 Parliaments existed across France to act as “supreme court”.5 As an example, 
the Parliament of Paris judged in last resort cases according to 50 different customs (Chénon, 1929, 
vol. I, p. 323). Montesquieu was highly favorable to this diversity as a guarantee against potential 
despotism of one unique law.6 According to Montesquieu, the laws are "the necessary relations 
derived from the nature of things" (Esprit des Lois, I, 1) they are forged by history and determined by 
the environment in which they appear. They must be diversified, as diversified are the peoples.  
This diversity of the legal regimes was headed by a strict partition between two legal principles. 
Northern France was under customary law (pays de coutumes, customary country) whereas the 
southern part (pays de droit écrit, written law country) was under Roman law, namely the corpus 
juris civilis of Justinian (Ourliac and Malafosse, 1968, vol. 3, p. 7).7  In the South, Roman law was 
positive law and the “written law” had to be taken into account in all circumstances (lex scripta) 
(Bellomo, 1995 p. 102). Since the Roman civil law was in force in written law country, the judge had 
to apply the comprehensive Justinian code, which offered him less freedom and initiatives than in 
customary country (Declareuil, 1925, p. 825). The strict application of the Justinian law in written law 
country is reinforced in the 16th century, because the Roman law “reborn a second time” with new 
methods and new texts, better distributed through print (Chénon, 1929, vol. I, p. 329).  
In customary country, the Roman law could only have a doctrinal influence as in English common law 
(Plucknett, 1939).8 In the northern part of France, Roman law was not the “law” that had the force of 
positive law but was valid only if a judge wanted to take it into account as ratio scripta for its power 
of suggestion and as a “reasonable” aid in making a difficult judicial decision. But lawyers in trial 
could not refer to the Justinian codes in the customary area according an Ordinance of Philippe III in 
1278.9 In Paris, the teaching of the Roman law was forbidden from 1219 (Decretal Super Speculam of 
Honorius III).10 In 1219, the French king Philippe-Auguste, asked the Pope to ban the teaching and 
learning of Roman law in Paris. The penalties for both students and teacher were excommunication 
and a ban on practicing law. The French king did not want that, in his capital, people studied texts 
saying that they must obey a Roman Emperor since his Germanic enemy pretend to be the Holy 
Roman Emperor. The justification is: “In Ile de France and others Provinces, we do not use the law of 
the Roman Empire.”11 Others argue this ban is a will of the Pope to promote the study of the Canon 
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law.12 The study of the Roman law was allowed again in Paris in 1679 (Edit de Saint Germain en Laye 
of Louis XIV) but a strong primacy was given to courses and teachers of the “French customary law”. 
 
Origin of the legal dichotomy 
Official boundaries of the Roman law part of France are finally fixed during the 13th and 14th 
centuries. In 1164, the representatives of the Viscountess of Narbonne to Louis VII claim their 
territories fell under Roman law from immemorial time (Rigaudière, 1996). The term ‘written law 
country’ (jus scriptum) appears in 1250 in an Ordinance of Blanche de Castille (Chénon 1929, vol. 0, p. 
488). This Ordinance confirms one specific land is under Roman law for immemorial times but can 
also be accepted as a general rule for the southern part of the country (Rigaudière, 1996). The king of 
France recognizes the existence ab antiquo of Roman law and defines the areas as early as 1270. This 
recognition of the application of the Roman law in southern France is favorable to the French King. 
The French king used the legal role conferred to the Emperor by the Justinian code to assert his 
authority and power on the annexed southern provinces. Acting as an Emperor in his kingdom, the 
French King used the Roman law to increase the rights of the crown.  
The origin of the legal dichotomy can be explained by history. The Roman law area is where Roman 
domination was the oldest and deepest. Then, this population has been the least mixed with German 
invaders and retained its own specific law even under the domination of the Germans (Klimrath, 
1837). The written law country is approximately the same as the territory previously occupied by 
Visigoths and Burgundians, which issued for their Gallo-Roman subjects the Lex Romana 
Burgundionum and, the influential Breviarium Alaricianum.13 Others also point out the role of the 
notaries to diffuse the rediscovered Roman law from Italy since 1160 (Gouron, 1957). In any case, 
this legal partition between customary and civil law is exogenous to the economic development that 
reached across modern France. 
 
Writing of customs 
Before the 15th century, customs were sometimes written but without any official approval. In cases 
of a lawsuit, the judge stated if the applicable custom was known of him (notoire) or not. If the 
custom was not notoire, the judge required a “turbe” which was a group of at least 10 people who 
could confirm unanimously the existence of a custom (Pissard, 1910). This system is similar to what 
was called the jury in England (Klerman and Mahoney, 2007). The system of turbe disappeared in 
1667 after all the customs having been written. Customs have been gradually written after the 
Ordinance of Montil-Lès-Tours in 1454. The written customs were not a codification (Ourliac and 
Malafosse, 1968, p.8), the nature of the custom remains:  « It is the people who made the law » 
(Coquille, 1665). Written customs are short documents: 190 articles for the custom of Paris written in 
1510, then double that number when the custom of Paris was modified in 1580. These customs were 
collected in books called Coutumier Général as early as 1536 (Chénon, 1929, vol. I, p. 363). The 
Coutumier Général from Bourdot de Richebourg published in 1724 is the most comprehensive (1,200 
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pages). Common law countries also have codes, such as the Uniform Commercial Code in the United 
States, and the many codes of the State of California (see, Weiss, 2000 Herman, 1996 and Donald, 
1973). Some of these codes have even more statutes than the equivalent civil law codes. Merryman 
(1969) explains that the codes in common law countries often summarize prior judicial decisions, 
which is exactly the process of the written customs of the Old Regime France. 
Customs also existed in written law country but mainly for cities and several Pyrenean valleys 
whereas the customs were for whole areas in customary law country. But more importantly, these 
customs only deal with specific issues. When a novelty appeared in written country, the judge would 
have no choice but to respect Justinian law, whereas the judge in customary country was free make a 
bespoke ruling. These urban customs were written early to affirm what was different in the local 
practice compared to the standard Justinian law, which was at that time rediscovered as a whole. For 
example, the custom of the city of Toulouse, published in 1286, officially stated that the previous 
jurisprudence of the municipal justice was to be applied in most cases to defend the local practices 
while the standard Roman law was applied by the royal justice in the whole County of Toulouse after 
its annexation in 1271. 
 
Judge-made law 
In a few cases, the King created the law through ordinances, but this was mainly for public and 
procedural issues (Chénon 1929, vol. 0, p. 530). A Parliament could refuse or correct the ordinance of 
the King (it was called a Remontrance) even if the king had the last word, but this long and 
complicated procedure was used infrequently (Chénon, 1929, vol. I, p. 347); La Fronde (1648-1653) 
civil war was in fact due to such a conflict between the King and the Parliaments. The most important 
ordinance for business was the Ordonance de Commerce (called Code Savary) promulgated  by Jean-
Baptiste Colbert in 1673, which was a written account of the practices that were at that time 
followed by merchants. After 1730, several ordinances dealt with private law to try to unify rules 
across the kingdom. The result of this movement was the enhancement of the duality of the legal 
system, with a partial unification of the customary country via the custom of Paris and a strict respect 
of Justinian code in written law country (Chénon, 1929, vol I, p. 317).  
French judges were independent from the power. Ironically, venality made French judges more 
independent than their English counterparts, for example. Most French judges were not selected by 
the king, and he could not remove them except in extraordinary circumstances (Klerman and 
Mahoney, 2007). All offices were allowed to be officially sold in France from 152214  and inherited 
then from 1604 in exchange of an annual tax of 1/60 of the value of the inherited office (Chénon, 
1929, vol. I, p. 565).15 From a legal point of view, what were sold were the revenues of the office and 
not the office itself.  This system is still the same today for the office notary; a notary should have a 
degree and the property of an office. A new officer (or after a change of king) needed to obtain a 
“lettre de confirmation” from the King, which was only a tax because they had to pay for it, (Bodin, 
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1576 in Chénon, 1929, vol. I, p. 341) and at a later stage they would have to pass an examination.16 
The property of one office is quickly considered as real estate and thus can be sold, exchanged, 
pawned, seized... This private property nature of the office gave the judges a near-perfect level 
independence from the state, which exerted direct control over neither their promotion nor their 
resignation. 
This independence helped Parliamentarians to affirm themselves. The Parliaments applied the rule of 
precedent (case law). Since they were the jurisdictions of last resort, one Parliament could judge a 
new case as an Arrêt de Règlement, meaning it will then always be judged in the same way. One 
Arrêt de Règlement is thus imposed onto inferior jurisdictions (Chénon, 1929, vol. 0, p. 530 and vol. I, 
p. 362). The first Arrêt de Règlement was from the Parliament of Paris in 1353. Due to the fact there 
were 14 different Parliaments, one Arrêt de Règlement could then be imitated in another Parliament 
or not. This procedure is similar to “precedent case” in the common law.17 
The wide freedom of judges to decide cases led to a very rich jurisprudence (even in written law 
country). Collections of cases are recorded. A famous one is by Louet (1602), augmented by Brodeau 
(1614) and then Rousseau de La Combe (1742). Each Parliament generates specific publications of 
their jurisprudence.18 During the 18th century, these collections were presented in the form of 
dictionaries (Malafosse and Ourliac, 1968, vol. III, p. 17). The most comprehensive is the Répertoire 
universel et raisonné de jurisprudence civile, criminelle, canonique et bénéficiale of Joseph-Nicolas 
Guyot, published between 1775 and 1783. It represents 65 volumes of about 550 pages each, 
meaning about 35,750 pages of jurisprudence.  
 
Legal issues of economic problems 
A large part of this jurisprudence stemmed from economic issues. Legal origin theory first 
emphasizes the impact of the legal regime on the rules governing financial activities. Financial 
activities were developed early. Studies suggest that financial factors may have been even more 
important in promoting growth in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries than they are today (Bordo and 
Rousseau, 2006). About 50,000 notary acts dealing with credit are observed in 1700 in Paris 
(Hoffman et al., 2001). A study of loans contracted in a town in southeastern France between 1630 
and 1788 suggest that credit markets were both active and flexible (Rosenthal, 1993). A large and 
diversified credit market also existed in the rural, “less-developed” areas in the 17th century (Ogilvie 
et al., 2012, Postel-Vinay, 1998).  
The financial activities suffered sometimes due to the legal fragmentation, making crucial the role of 
jurisprudence. For instance, the perpetual annuity, a standard financial tool of the time, was 
considered as movable property in several customs (Blois, Reims, Troies, Lorraine…), as immovable 
property in others (Paris, Orléans…) and was unknown to the Justinian code. The owner of a 
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perpetual annuity living under a custom accepting it as an immovable property was able to mortgage 
it as any real-estate. If the owner of the annuity were to move his home to a city under a custom 
considering perpetual annuity as movable property, the beneficiary of the mortgage lost his right. In 
1697, to solve this conflict, an arrêt of the Parliament of Paris said that the mortgage still existed 
despite this perpetual annuity not being an immovable property any more (Guyot, 1787, vol. 53, p. 
445). 
Before the industrial Revolution, the main economic issue was agriculture. The country as a whole 
was confronted by new farming methods, which required a more complete system of land property. 
In many cases, the owner of land shared its use with the community which owned usage rights, such 
as grazing rights (vaine pature meaning the entire ownership of a piece of land is limited to only a 
few months before the harvest, all the community are allowed to use it the rest of the time); 
personal use of wood for heating and building; the interdiction to change a pasture to a sown field; 
the gleaning right, which imposed a minimal size of the cut straw stems, leading to the ban of the 
scythe by several Parliaments; it was sometimes required to entrust the landowner’s cattle to the 
common shepherd … (Avenel, 1910). To be able to change the farming methods implies that 
property rights had previously been clarified. Another embedded property resulted from feudal 
rights. Most of lands were initially owned by a lord that had leased land in exchange for several rights 
(bail à cens). Depending on the contract, the owner of a land should have to pay a rent in nature 
(limiting the possibility to change the production) or to refer to his lord in many situations. These 
legal issues are also crucial when massive investments were to be undertaken to drain or irrigate 
unproductive lands (Rosenthal, 2009). 
As an example, the cases from one feudal tax on transactions (called lods et vente) enforced by one 
lord is presented in an 800 page book (Molière-Fonmaur, 1783). This book deals with numerous 
different cases of tax on agreement to sell, forced sale, auction, sale of rights, sale of mortgage, sale 
by the clergy, sale of easements, sale of the right to act, sharing, exchange, sale with right of 
repurchase, repurchase, gifts, dowries, inheritance, cancellation of sale, emphyteutic lease, sale by 
the land-lord, various forms of ownership (fief, usufruct, bare ownership, free-hold, attached objects, 
boats, mills ...), payment date, how to calculate the value of property, the tax rate... So many issues 
for which the adaptability of the customary law is expected to provide better answers to new 
economic needs than the Roman law codified in the 6th century in the Eastern Roman Empire.  
 
2. Data 
Dummy variable for the legal regime 
To characterize the legal regime of each area, we use the work of Henri Klimrath (1837), Carte de la 
France coutumière, which provides a detailed limit of the customary and civil areas. Figure 1 shows 
the two legal systems and the frontiers of the judicatures of the 14 Parliaments. The civil law part of 
France was ruled by five sovereign courts: the Parliaments of Bordeaux, Toulouse, Pau, Aix, and 
Grenoble, the Conseils souverains of Roussilon and, for several specific locations, the Parliaments of 
Paris19 and Dijon. The rest of France is under customary law. In 1790, 86 Departments, based on 
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geography, are substituted to the previous administrative entities. Each of these Departments lodges 
a commissary of the state (Préfet) in, most cases, the main city, which is then called the Préfecture. 
48 of these Departments were previously under customary law, 31 under civil law and 7 partially 
under the two legal systems. We use these new entities, the Departments, in the following analysis. 
 
Figure 1, Map of civil and customary parts of France before 1789 
 
Measures of economic development 
Our first economic measure is called TAX. We collect the amount of direct taxes paid in each 
Department. These direct taxes will then be known as the “four vieilles” (four olds) since these four 
taxes remained unchanged for decades. The first one (contribution foncière) is a tax on the value of 
real estate (land and building) paid by the owner.20 The second one (contribution personnelle 
mobilière) is a tax on the value of houses, but paid by the occupant and not the owner.21 The third 
one (patente) is a tax on business (trade and industry) mainly based on the value of the building 
occupied.22 The last one (portes et fenêtres) is a tax on the number of doors and windows visible 
from the street, again paid by the occupant and not the owner.23 
                                                          
20
 loi des 23 novembre - 1er décembre 1790. 
21
 loi des 13 janvier - 18 février 1791. 
22
 loi du 2-17 mars 1791. 
23
 loi du 4 Frimaire an VII : 24 mars 1798. 
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These taxes provide a correct measure of the economic development of one Department, which is 
comparable across France since rates and methods of taxation are similar. These taxes are only 
weakly dependent on the business cycle and could sometimes be underestimated since they are 
mainly based on a difficult exercise of valuation of properties; a taxpayer can contest the case of 
overestimation of the values used to tax, thus underestimation is probably more frequent than 
overestimation. To avoid any effect of local variation of the economic conditions, we use an average 
of five years (1817-1821). Then, we use the population of each Department from the census of 1822 
to obtain the TAX paid per capita in each Department. Figure 2 shows the important differences 
across the country we observe. An average of 11.79 francs is paid by French people with inhabitants 
in Seine paying on average 13.69 times more than those in Corse (Table1). 
 
Our second measure, CONTRACTS, is also fiscal data, but provides an assessment of financial 
development. We collect the amount of tax paid as Enregistrement in each Department. The “Droit 
d’enregistrement” is a tax paid on the value of all notarized contracts. Enregistrement tax is an 
efficient way to measure financial development as it is a fixed rate (depending on the kind of 
transaction) applied on all contracts recorded by a notary including gift-making and inheritance, but 
the main base of taxes are sales, personal loans and mortgages. Before the development of the 
banking system, notaries provided a large allocation of capital. Mortgages through notaries 
represented 40% of the GDP of France in 1840 (Hoffman et al., 2011). Again, we use an average of 
five years of tax (1817-1821), we then divided the figures by the population of each Department 
according to the census of 1822. Figure 3 highlights that together with the Parisian region, the 
Departments with the highest value of CONTRACTS per capita are those of the big commercial cities 
of Marseille, Lyon and Rouen. Extremes are again Seine and Corse with a magnitude of 16.91 times. 
Our last measure is the number of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita. We use the data of the census 
of 1822, which provides the number of doors and windows and this number is divided by the number 
of inhabitants of each Department according to this same census. This measure reflects the standard 
of living in terms of real estate, since it constitutes a proxy for the number of houses and rooms per 
capita. To enjoy a high number of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita implies to have previously 
financed these buildings. France exhibits large variations in local architectures but there is nothing 
preventing the building of more houses, rooms and windows. One of these variations is the 
adaptation of the buildings to the heat in the south. But this adaptation encompasses a smaller 
overall size of windows in the south without an impact on the number of windows. Thus, the number 
of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita is a suitable measure of the economic development reached in 
one area. On average a French person has 1.1 DOORS AND WINDOWS. Due to higher population 
density, Departments with important cities, as the Seine with Paris, do not exhibit high economic 
development according to this measure. The dispersion is more limited with the inhabitants of Eure 
enjoying 3.25 more DOORS AND WINDOWS than those of Creuse. 
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Figure 2, Map of TAX paid per capita in each Department 
 
Figure 3, Map of CONTRACTS per capita in each Department 
 
0-7
8-11
12-14
15-19
>19
Civil Law
Customary 
Law
0
3-4
5-6
7-9
>9
Civil Law
Customary 
Law
13 
 
 
Figure 4, Map of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita in each Department 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of our measures of economic development 
 
 
3. Are civil law Departments less developed? 
We begin by observing the relationship between the legal regime and economic development. We 
compare the average of our three measures of economic development in the 31 Departments under 
civil law and the 48 under customary law (7 were both under civil and customary law). The Civil Law 
Departments exhibit weaker results according to our three measures of development (Table 2, 
Sample A). An inhabitant of a customary law Department paid on average 26.32 % more TAX, 
CONTRACTS of 15.35 % more value and enjoyed 14.51 % more DOORS AND WINDOWS. 
According to a T-test, these differences are significant at the 5 % level, except for CONTRACTS. We 
first check if the higher development remains true after having weighted the averages by the 
population of each Department. Indeed, Departments are quite similar on the surface but not in 
terms of population; 905,764 people live in the Nord compared to only 121,418 in the Hautes-Alpes. 
Since civil law Departments are generally less populous, the previous observations are reinforced 
when adjusted for population. The differences between civil and customary Departments are higher 
and significant at 1 % level except for CONTRACTS, which is however now significant at the 5% level 
(Table 2, Sample B). 
0-0,75
0,75-1
1-1,5
1,5-1,75
>1,75
Civil Law
Customary 
Law
Average Mediane Standard-Dev. Minima Maximum Obs.
TAX 11,79 11,04 4,52 2,49 33,61 86
CONTRACTS 4,59 4,18 2,11 1,12 18,97 86
DOORS AND WINDOWS 1,10 1,04 0,31 0,60 1,94 86
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Furthermore, the difference between the two samples is accentuated by the two extreme cases. The 
richest Department (except for DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita) is Seine, which encompasses 
Paris. In a centralized country such as France, a significant part of the wealth of Paris should come 
from the administrative position of the city. On the other extreme, Corsica is the poorest Department 
(except in terms of DOORS AND WINDOWS per cap.) which could be explained by the insularity and 
the relatively complicated political situation (France bought Corsica from the Genoese in 1768) 
suffering several wars during the 18th century. Thus, we measure these averages omitting Paris and 
Corsica as outliers. Excluding these two outliers, the differences strongly decrease and become non-
significant (Table 2, Sample C). 
 
Table 2. Economic development according to legal regime 
 
 
4. Does the legal regime explain the weaker development of civil law Departments? 
Method 
To asses if the legal regime explains the disadvantage we observed in civil law Departments, we 
control for an array of other potential determinants of economic development. We consider the 
following cross-Departments regression: 
 
 =  + 	
		 +  +   
 
Where   is a measure of economic performance for Department i (log. of TAX paid per capita, log. of 
CONTRACTS per capita and log. of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita), 	
		 is the legal 
regime dummy variable, equal to one in civil law Departments,   is a matrix of control variables for 
each Department (Distance from Paris, average altitude, presence of a Secondary Court…) and   is 
the error term. The control variables are exogenous fundamental factors that are suspected of 
Customary Civil Difference T-test Both
(1) (2) (1) - (2)  (p-value) (3)
TAX 12,98 10,27 2,70 0,0108** 10,33
CONTRACTS 4,90 4,25 0,65 0,1971 4,00
DOORS AND WINDOWS 1,18 1,03 0,15 0,0324** 0,85
TAX 13,41 10,68 2,74 0,0002*** 10,56
CONTRACTS 5,24 4,45 0,79 0,0262** 4,03
DOORS AND WINDOWS 1,22 1,04 0,18 0,0003*** 0,86
TAX 11,95 10,53 1,42 0,1039 10,33
CONTRACTS 4,42 4,35 0,06 0,8536 4,00
DOORS AND WINDOWS 1,14 1,04 0,10 0,1433 0,85
N. obs 48 31 7
Panel B: All sample weighted by population
Panel A: All sample
Panel C: Without Corse and Seine
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explaining the differences in economic development. We exclude the Departments crossed by the 
customary/civil law boarder. We retain 79 observations.24 
A negative and significant coefficient  is interpreted as evidence for a negative impact from the 
CIVIL LAW regime on economic development. 
 
Does the legal regime explanation remain robust to climate? 
Climate is the oldest exogenous variable suspected of impacting the economic development of a 
Department. An early version of the geography hypothesis goes back to Montesquieu, who believed 
that climate, in particular heat, shaped human attitudes and motivation, which in turn affected 
economic outcomes. The direct effect of climate is verified by recent research, especially the 
negative effect of tropical locations (Sachs, 2001).25 The differences of climate within France are 
weak compared to international observations but could be strong enough to explain differences in 
economic development. We use the meteorological data (Météo France) from the Préfecture of each 
Department. The average maximum (TEMP. MAXIMUM) is 20.3 Celsius in the Department of Var 
versus only 12.6 in Nièvre. Similar differences are observed for the average minimum temperature 
(TEMP. MINIMUM), total rain in millimeters (RAIN) and number of hours of sun (SUN). 
The results of Table 3 indicate that temperature and sun do not exhibit any correlation with our 
measures of economic development. But the quantity of RAIN over one year is negatively and 
significantly correlated with our three measures. A high quantity of RAIN is associated with poor 
Departments. This observation is theoretically consistent with a country such as France (it is probably 
different in arid regions). Accepting that each Department receives enough RAIN, a high level of RAIN 
leads to problems for agriculture and higher costs for land transport when roads were frequently dirt 
and unsurfaced. The dummy for CIVIL LAW always exhibits a negative coefficient i.e., civil law 
Departments are less economically developed. But this variable is non-significant in most of the 
specifications. The R² of the combinations of the legal regime and climate, as explanations for 
economic outcomes, is very low, leading to some doubts about the ability of these variables to 
explain the differences in economic performance across the Departments we observe. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 We exclude Cantal, Charente, Charente Inférieur, Haute Loire, Puy-de-Dôme, Saône-et-Loire and Haute 
Vienne. 
25
 We don’t use climatic and geographical variables as the source of the type institutions as proposed by the 
“endowment view” chaining natural endowments to colonization strategy, property rights and to the level of 
economic development (see Levine, 2005). This causal chain does not make sense for France. 
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Table 3. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by climate. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
 
Does the legal regime explanation remain robust to geography? 
A contemporaneous strand of research explains international development by the direct impact of 
physical characteristics: countries being landlocked, distance from large markets or limited access to 
coasts and ocean navigable rivers (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gallup et al., 1999; Malik and Temple, 
2005). Geographical and climatic variables jointly account for 44 % of contemporary variation in log 
current income using regressions across countries (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2012). While geographical 
differences may not be as dramatic within France as across countries, they may still exert economic 
effects across Departments. We therefore test the robustness of the better economic outcomes of 
the customary Department including several geographical control variables.  
Within France, all Departments do not benefit from a similar geography, providing exogenous 
advantages according to several physical characteristics. A first geographical advantage is the 
distance to the sea (KM TO SEA) measured as the number of kilometers between the Préfecture and 
the closest sea. Sea is at this time the best way to exchange thus, the further a Department is from 
the sea the less inhabitants can exchanged and specialize themselves in more advantageous 
activities. The positive effect of coast is empirically verified in the US (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003). 
But in our sample of French Departments (see Table 4), the KM TO SEA seems unable to explain any 
part of the difference in the development. 
Civil Temp. Temp. Rain Hours Adjusted R² F test Obs.
Law Minimum Maximum mm of sun
TAX -0,2677*** 0,0217 0,0763 4,2225 79
(0,0055) (0,4725)
-0,2188* -0,0074 0,0706 3,9635 79
(0,0821) (0,8205)
-0,2121*** -0,0008*** 0,2611 14,7779 79
(0,0069) (0,0000)
-0,2934** 0,0001 0,0767 4,2378 79
(0,0106) (0,4610)
-0,0360 0,0411 -0,0654 -0,0009*** -0,0001 0,2665 6,6678 79
(0,7741) (0,2721) (0,1230) (0,0000) (0,5653)
CONTRACTS -0,1036 -0,0084 -0,0046 0,8210 79
(0,3063) (0,7956)
-0,0123 -0,036948834 0,0093 1,3662 79
(0,9261) (0,2899)
-0,0962 -0,0006** 0,0759 4,2047 79
(0,2769) (0,0116)
-0,1525 0,0001 -0,0024 0,9062 79
(0,2085) (0,6297)
0,0889 0,0197 -0,0806* -0,0007*** 0,0000 0,0838 2,4261 79
(0,5379) (0,6454) (0,0988) (0,0078) (0,8680)
DOORS AND WINDOWS -0,0916 -0,0145 0,0222 1,8839 79
(0,1750) (0,5020)
-0,0159 -0,0342 0,0442 2,8029 79
(0,8561) (0,1407)
-0,1024* -0,0003* 0,0512 3,1034 79
(0,0920) (0,0988)
-0,1686** 0,0001 0,0323 2,3005 79
(0,0375) (0,2664)
-0,0137 0,0197 -0,0675** -0,0002 0,0002 0,0930 2,5989 79
(0,5379) (0,8448) (0,0403) (0,1251) (0,1397)
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This absence of a positive effect of the proximity of the sea could be due to another geographical 
advantage, which facilitated the exchange: the presence of navigable rivers. A navigable river 
provides about the same advantages in terms of exchange as the sea itself. Sokoloff (1988) shows 
that the patents per capita, used as a proxy for inventive activity are strongly and positively 
correlated with the proximity to navigable rivers. Some Departments are efficiently crossed by 
navigable RIVERS (up to 510 km), whereas 17 others do not have a single kilometer of navigable river. 
We use the kilometers of navigable rivers only and not kilometers of canals, since the building of a 
canal in a Department could be a result of a prior development, thus would be endogenous. The 
result of the regressions (Table 4) exhibits a positive and significant relationship of RIVERS with our 
three measures of economic outcomes.   
A third geographical characteristic able to influence development is the average altitude of each 
Department (ALTITUDE). A high average is the result of the presence of hills and mountains leading 
to more costly land exchanges and to more complicated general activity. The difference is huge 
between four Departments with an average ALTITUDE higher than 1,000 meters (up to 1,671 meters 
for Hautes-Alpes) and others being very flat.26 The coefficient of the variable ALTITUDE is negative 
but only significant in explaining the TAX paid per capita. 
The main result of Table 4 is that the legal regime explanation is rarely robust to the geography 
according to our three measures of development. CIVIL LAW Departments do exhibit lower economic 
outcomes but this relationship is non-significant for most of our specifications. The legal regime is 
never significant after having controlled for the average ALTITUDE of the Department. The second 
important observation is that neither geography nor legal regime are able to explain a large part of 
the differences of development in the 79 French Departments. The maximum R² we obtain is only 
0.1777.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 We reject the variable “surface of arable land per capita” since it depends on the number of inhabitants 
within each Department, which is not an independent factor form the Department’s economic development. 
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Table 4. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by geography. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Does the legal regime explanation remain robust to long-term political factors? 
A third category of factors can potentially explain the level of development of a Department: the 
long-term effect of political factors mainly inherited from the hazard of historical events. The first 
manifestation of the existence of a political community is the frontier. The French frontiers are 
exogenous results of war, marriages and settlement of estates. We could suspect that the 
Departments on the FRONTIER might have suffered from limitation of exchanges or specific taxes. 
The variable FRONTIER is a dummy variable, equal to one for the borderer Departments. FRONTIER 
appears to be significantly negative in only one specification and exhibits several cases of positive 
coefficients.  
A second administrative variable is the presence of one PARLIAMENT. In Old Regime France, a 
PARLIAMENT is the Supreme Court presiding over one legal area. Several administrative authorities 
are associated with the presence of a PARLIAMENT in a city. These multiple administrations take 
advantages of revenues coming from all the area which they control. We assume the presence of a 
PARLIAMENT is an exogenous variable since the location of one PARLIAMENT is the result of the 
hazard of history. They are mainly established in a former fiefdom of local lords who took power 
before being attached to the kingdom of France. They are often in big cities, but not always. For 
example, Trévoux has a PARLIAMENT despite being a small city (but the origin of a previously 
powerful dynasty) and Lyon, the second city of the country, does not have a PARLIAMENT. Thus, this 
dummy for PARLIAMENT partially captures the presence of big cities but not solely. 14 PARLIAMENTS 
Civil Law Km to sea Rivers Altitude Adjusted R² F test Obs.
TAX -0,2515*** -0,0002 0,0728 4,0606 79
(0,0060) (0,6345)
-0,2381*** 0,0000** 0,1254 6,5918 79
(0,0052) (0,0313)
-0,0784 -0,0005*** 0,0142 1,5607 79
(0,4059) (0,0016)
-0,0745 0,0002 0,0000 -0,0005** 0,1777 5,2152 79
(0,4926) (0,5953) (0,3648) (0,0122)
CONTRACTS -0,0776 0,0005 0,0190 1,7544 79
(0,4121) (0,1725)
-0,1135 0,0000* 0,0315 2,2666 79
(0,0052) (0,0927)
-0,0461 -0,0002 0,0142 1,5607 79
(0,6656) (0,2219)
0,0173 0,0007* 0,0000 -0,0003 0,0506 2,0382 79
(0,8851) (0,0793) (0,3132) (0,2192)
DOORS AND WINDOWS -0,1036 0,0001 0,0182 1,7234 79
(0,1069) (0,7021)
-0,1097* 0,0000** 0,0725 4,0502 79
(0,0676) (0,0350)
-0,0652 -0,0001 0,0353 2,4251 79
(0,4059) (0,2256)
0,0173 -0,0721 0,0000 -0,0001 0,0541 2,1161 79
(0,8851) (0,0002) (0,1023) (0,5521)
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existed under the Old Regime.27 This dummy appears to be significantly associated with the 
economic development in all the specifications. Regressions including this variable show an R 
squared always above 0.10 (Table 5). 
A last administrative variable is the distance from Paris (KM TO PARIS), measured as the crow flies 
from Paris to the Préfecture of the Department. Since Paris is the capital of the country, the distance 
from the capital reduces the opportunity to influence state decisions and profit from tax 
redistribution. The presence of the capital in Paris is exogenous since it is the result of the victory of a 
minor Frankish King, Clovis, whose armies drove away Roman soldiers from the city, which was not a 
Roman capital. Then, the successive military success of this kingdom over centuries brought about 
Paris’ status as the capital of the large territory we study in this paper. The KM TO PARIS is highly 
significant in all specifications to explain lower levels of economic development. 
Controlling for these political variables, Table 5 reveals that CIVIL LAW Departments exhibit 
significant negative coefficients in only two specifications, explaining the level of TAX paid. More 
important, three other cases exhibit significant coefficients, but with a positive impact from civil law. 
Explaining the CONTRACTS per capita by the KM TO PARIS and by the combination of these political 
factors, the dummy for CIVIL LAW is positive and significant. A similar positive and significant 
coefficient is found for the CIVIL LAW dummy when the number of DOORS AND WINDOWS is 
explained by the KM TO PARIS. These three cases are interesting because they show a positive and 
significant effect of CIVIL LAW after the control for the variable, which is always highly significant 
(which is the KM TO PARIS). The R squared of the regression, explaining CONTRACTS by the 
combination of these political factors, rises to 0.28. These three specifications show results clearly 
inconsistent with law and finance theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Paris, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Grenoble, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Trévoux, Rennes, Pau, Metz, Douai, Besançon, and 
Nancy. 
20 
 
Table 5. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by long-term administrative factors. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Does the legal regime explanation remain robust to religion and knowledge? 
A last set of regressions is run to control for the impact of the legal regime by cultural effects, namely 
Protestantism and distance to knowledge.28 Protestantism is one of the classical cultural institutions 
that have been presented as favorable to economic development since Weber (1930). Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) update the work of Weber (1930) arguing that British legal origin countries are 
primarily Protestant, while French legal origin countries are overwhelmingly Catholic. They argue that 
legal origin proxies for religious and cultural differences that influence financial development and 
that difference in legal tradition, per se, is not crucial for explaining current levels of financial 
development. Stulz and Williamson (2003) identify three channels through which culture can 
influence economic outcomes: values of the society, institutions and resource allocation. We can 
suppose that the percentage of Protestants in modern France was not enough to influence 
institutions, but the two other channels may have a potential impact in Departments with a large 
Protestant community. 
                                                          
28
 We also explored the potential negative effect of the Napoleonic wars on the economic development of one 
Department. We used Vallée (1956) which reproduces the tables measuring population and number of 
conscripts per Department from the military administration of the Empire (not reproduced in the paper). The 
percentage of conscripts is positively correlated with the economic development. Indeed, the conscription was 
stronger in Departments rich enough to provide soldiers whereas poor areas (such as Britany) were partially 
exempted. Due to this endogeneity, it is not possible to control for a potential negative effect of the 
Napoleonic wars. 
Civil Law Frontier Parliament Km from Adjusted R² F test Obs.
Paris
TAX -0,2456*** -0,1659 0,0949 5,0901 79
(0,0047) (0,1520)
-0,2351*** 0,1905** 0,1241 6,5252 79
(0,0058) (0,0334)
0,0600 -0,0010*** 0,2131 11,5624 79
(0,5953) (0,0004)
0,0725 -0,2054** 0,2482*** -0,0010*** 0,3032 9,4844 79
(0,4972) (0,0484) (0,0027) (0,0001)
CONTRACTS -0,1135 0,0293 -0,0048 0,8149 79
(0,2184) (0,8142)
-0,1083 0,2824*** 0,1065 5,6505 79
(0,2124) 0,28%
0,2135* -0,0011*** 0,1566 8,2419 79
(0,0789) (0,0003)
0,2462** -0,0240 0,3184*** -0,0012*** 0,2765 8,4506 79
(0,0304) (0,8237) (0,0003) (0,0000)
DOORS AND WINDOWS -0,1080 0,0293 -0,0048 0,8149 79
(0,2184) (0,8142)
-0,1073 0,1439*** 0,1065 5,6505 79
(0,2124) (0,0028)
0,0356* -0,0011*** 0,0871 4,7198 79
(0,0789) (0,0003)
0,0550 -0,0240 0,3184** -0,0005*** 0,1449 4,3057 79
(0,5031) (0,8237) (0,0152) (0,0076)
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France is an excellent laboratory to test the positive effect of Protestantism since important 
protestant populations were concentrated in several areas since the 16th century. Despite terrible 
Religious wars and the huge emigration of Huguenots to northern Europe, a large protestant 
community remained established in France up to the 20th century. We do not have high quality data 
for the presence of Protestants before the 19th century, thus we use the % OF PROTESTANT in each 
Department as measured by the census of 1866. We assume this figure is a correct proxy for the 
presence of Protestants for centuries, which is confirmed by the historical narrative (Cabanel, 2012) 
and a second series of the 274 places allowed for Protestants in 1620 (de Dainville, 1968).29 There is 
substantial cross-Department variation in the % OF PROTESTANT in the population, ranking from 0 % 
in several Departments up to 30.77 % in Bas-Rhin (Alsace) and 28.66 % in Gard (Cévennes). If several 
protestant families, such as Peugeot, are known to have been successful entrepreneurs, other 
Protestant communities, such as in Cevennes, remained underdeveloped. LLSV (1999) and Beck et al. 
(2000, 2001) also use the fraction of a population that practices a given religion in the multiple 
regressions in their international studies. The % OF PROTESTANT is never significant to explain the 
economic outcomes among Departments, with sometimes a negative coefficient (Table 6). This 
absence of relation between Protestantism and economic development confirms Delacroix and 
Nielsen (2001); they conclude that Weber’s purported link between Protestantism and economic 
outcome is a “myth”. Becker and Woessmann (2009) do not find a positive effect of the specific ethic 
of Protestantism in Prussian counties after having controlled for literacy. 
A last variable we use is a measure of the access to knowledge through the distance in kilometers of 
each Préfecture to the closest university (KM TO UNIVERSITY). 21 universities were created in France 
between 1215 and 1538 to teach especially law.30 We can therefore expect a positive effect of a 
university, to spread knowledge, especially law, and to improve economic relations. The closest 
university sometimes corresponds to the closest important city, but not always. As an example, the 
small city of Cahors lodges a university founded in 1331 because the Pope John XXII was born in this 
city. On the other hand, the big city of Lyon does not have a university before the 20th century. This 
variable is always highly significant with the expected sign strongly increasing the R squared (Table 
6). 
Consistent with legal origin theory, the CIVIL LAW dummy exhibits negative coefficients after control 
for % OF PROTESTANT and KM TO UNIVERSITY. But, this coefficient is significant only when TAX paid 
is explained. CONTRACTS and DOORS AND WINDOWS are not robust to the controls even if a 
negative sign is associated with Departments under the civil law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29
 We count the number of places in each modern Department. Many Departments do not have a single place 
when the maximum is 30 in the Gard. This second series exhibit a correlation of 0.75 with the series of the 
census of Protestants in 1866. Thus, the use of this second series does not change our results. 
30
 Paris in 1215, then Toulouse, Montpellier, Avignon, Orléans, Cahors, Grenoble, Angers, Orange, Aix, 
Besançon, Poitiers, Caen, Bordeaux, Valence, Nantes, Bourges, Reims, Douai, Nancy and Strabourg in 1538. 
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Table 6. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by Protestantism and knowledge. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Does the legal regime explanation remain robust to a combination of control variables? 
Since the previous regressions of several kinds of variables exhibit diverging results regarding both 
the impact and the significance of CIVIL LAW, a combination of control variables along with CIVIL 
LAW are added together to account for their joint influence on economic development. We retain 
the six variables which have proved to have been able to explain our measures of development as a 
single control for the legal regime. We thus use RAIN, RIVERS, ALTITUDE, PARLIAMENT, KM TO PARIS 
and KM TO UNIVERSITY. Table 7 shows the results of these regressions. KM TO PARIS and KM TO 
UNIVERSITY are significantly correlated with our three measures of economic development with the 
expected (negative) sign. The adjusted R-square are relatively high (>0.4) except when explaining 
DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita). Furthermore, when adding the CIVIL LAW dummy variable to the 
regressions, the adjusted R-square only weakly rises, or even decreases.  
More important, all results converge to find a positive coefficient of CIVIL LAW, contradicting legal 
origin theory; economic development is higher for CIVIL LAW Departments after having controlling 
for these six variables. This positive coefficient is significant at the 5 % level in explaining the value of 
CONTRACTS per capita. This unexpected observation of a positive effect of CIVIL LAW warrants 
further investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil Law % of Km to Adjusted R² F test Obs.
Protestant University
TAX -0,2372*** -0,1520 0,0705 3,9561 79
(0,0073) (0,8452)
-0,2019*** -0,0034*** 0,3108 18,5862 79
(0,0078) (0,0000)
-0,1857** -0,9636 -0,0036*** 0,3198 13,2226 79
(0,0145) (0,1610) (0,0000)
CONTRACTS -0,1290 1,0023 0,0138 1,5437 79
(0,1615) (0,2270)
-0,0726 -0,0038*** 0,2798 16,1480 79
(0,3534) (0,0000)
-0,0751 0,1535 -0,0038*** 0,2706 10,6449 79
(0,3455) (0,8331) (0,0000)
DOORS AND WINDOWS -0,1190* 0,5904 0,0310 2,2481 79
(0,0546) (0,2863)
-0,0920 -0,0017*** 0,1389 7,2914 79
(0,3534) (0,0015)
-0,0751 0,2229 -0,0016*** 0,1294 4,8661 79
(0,1047) (0,6778) (0,0027)
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Table 7. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by a combination of factors. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
5. Are the Civil law Departments less financially developed? 
 
The first prediction of law and finance theory is that differences in legal regime can explain 
international differences in financial development. Furthermore, there is a substantial body of work 
suggesting that a high level of financial development promotes economic growth (Pasali, 2013). We 
previously assumed that the two causal relationships have been in action, since French legal regimes 
were enforced for centuries: better legal regime → higher ﬁnancial development → beber economic 
outcomes. Thus, we have used our three variables measuring both economic and financial 
development. 
Since the relationship between legal regime and economic outcomes is not verified and even at 
times appears to be the reverse of what was expected, we go back to the first prediction of the legal 
origin theory, testing only: better legal regime → higher ﬁnancial development. Thus, in this section, 
we only focus on financial development as measured by the amount of contracts per capita 
(CONTRACTS). To test if civil law is really unfavorable to financial development, we use the two other 
variables of economic outcomes (TAX and DOORS AND WINDOWS) as control variables for the 
dummy variable CIVIL LAW. We run the regression thereafter to explain the CONTRACT per capita 
using several specifications, i.e. between one and three explicative variables. These regressions 
answer the question: are the CIVIL LAW Departments less financially developed after controlling for 
the general wealth? 
 
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Table 8 provides the results of these regressions. It is not a surprise to observe that the amount of 
CONTRACTS per capita is heavily influenced by the economic development measured by the TAX paid 
per capita and the number of DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita. The R-squared is approximately 
0.74. Adding the dummy for CIVIL LAW Departments weakly improves the R-squared to 0.75. We do 
find a significant impact of CIVIL LAW, but observe a positive sign. Thus, controlling for the general 
level of development, the CIVIL LAW regime leads to a higher CONTRACTS per capita. This result is 
not consistent with legal origin theory. 
Civil Law Rain Rivers Altitude Parliament Km to Km to Adjusted R² F test Obs.
Paris University
TAX -0,0006** 0,0000 -0,0002* 0,0392 -0,0006*** -0,0026*** 0,5412 16,3336 79
(0,0002) 78,90% (0,0531) (0,5821) (0,0007) (0,0000)
0,1457 -0,0006*** 0,0000 -0,0003*** 0,0516 -0,0008*** -0,0026*** 0,5492 14,5770 79
(0,1349) (0,0004) (0,8062) (0,0173) (0,4690) (0,0005) (0,0000)
CONTRACTS -0,0003* 0,0000 0,0001 0,1795** -0,0007*** -0,0030*** 0,4097 10,0216 79
(0,0828) (0,9607) (0,3767) (0,0337) (0,0007) (0,0000)
0,2521** -0,0003 0,0000 0,0000 0,2008** -0,0010*** -0,0030*** 0,4423 9,8376 79
(0,0254) (0,1464) (0,4231) (0,8880) (0,0157) (0,0001) (0,0000)
DOORS AND WINDOWS -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0865 -0,0004** -0,0012** 0,1946 4,1412 79
(0,3114) (0,4483) (0,8986) (0,1895) (0,0170) (0,0361)
0,0364 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0895 -0,0004** -0,0012** 0,1851 3,5317 79
(0,6871) (0,3473) (0,5632) (0,9550) (0,1798) (0,0411) (0,0365)
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Table 8. Financial development controlled by economic outcomes. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
This counter intuitive result requires further explanations. First, the CIVIL LAW regime could be 
fundamentally better than the customary law regime in regards to the propensity to contract. The 
written nature of CIVIL LAW lowers the transaction costs by reducing the uncertainty thanks to a 
stable legal context and the standardizing of contracts. An unexplored effect of the current legal 
regime is the cost of justice which represents today 2.6 % of the US GDP versus only 0.6 in France or 
0.8 in Switzerland (Association Henri Capitan, 2006). Second, the higher propensity to contract using 
a notary could be an old path dependency because the notarial activity originated from Italy, 
diffusing more quickly in southern France than in the North. Third, a reversal effect could be 
imagined, the uncertainty in the southern institutions leads to the use a notary to record contracts 
more frequently than in the north. Fourth, our measure could be biased by the effect of the 
Revolution, which affected the credit market in the north more strongly than in the south. The 
inflation of the assignats allowed borrowers to reimburse perpetual annuities in devaluated money. 
This effect was not homogenous across France, since the perpetual annuity (rente) was the dominant 
financial tool, 60 % of the loans, in northern France compared to only 36.6 % in the south (Hoffman 
et al., 2004). Our data of CONTRACTS per capita could still be biased by this phenomenon even if the 
assignats episode was 27 years before the data were created. 
This rejection of legal origin theory within Old Regime France joins various researches. Empirical 
historical studies reject the consequence of legal origin theory: Rajan and Zingales (2003) and 
Musacchio (2008) find that, French civil law countries exhibit higher financial development before 
the First World War. Other researches do not observe that the legal environment is more favorable 
to the financial development in common law countries. Measuring the changes in the rules over time 
for several countries, Armour et al. (2009) cast some doubts on the plausibility of the mechanisms 
that have been said to underpin the links posited between legal origins and financial development. 
Comparing the business law in France and the United States during the 19th, it is found that the 
contracting environment in the United States was neither freer nor more flexible than in France 
(Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2005). According to the companies traded on the Milan stock exchange 
during the 20th century, Aganin and Volpin (2003) argue that the corporate ownership in Italy does 
not provide strong support for the law and finance view. Franks et al. (2003) stress that it was not 
until 1980 that English Parliament enacted strong minority shareholder rights statutes. Using 51 
bankruptcy laws from 15 countries during the 19th century, Sgard (2006) does not observe a 
determinant effect of legal origin.  
 
 
CIVIL TAX DOORS AND Adjusted R² F test Obs.
LAW WINDOWS
CONTRACTS 0,0984*** 0,8898*** 0,4891 38,3313 79
(0,0691) (0,0000)
0,0017 1,0519*** 0,4891 38,3313 79
(0,9798) (0,0000)
0,6480*** 0,4713*** 0,7386 111,2189 79
(0,0000) (0,0000)
0,1022** 0,6863*** 0,4754*** 0,7504 79,1523 79
(0,0358) (0,0000) (0,0000)
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6. Robustness checks on sample used 
We again run the test of the effect of the legal regime controlled by a combination of factors (Table 
7) and the test of the financial development controlled by economic outcomes (Table 8) which are 
our two most demonstrative regressions using two different samples. 
Are the results robust to the exclusion of two outliers? 
We exclude the two extreme cases which are Corse and Seine for the reasons explained in section 3. 
The main conclusion of our test on our three measures of economic outcomes remains similar after 
the omission of Seine and Corse. Contradicting the legal origin theory, the CIVIL LAW Departments 
exhibit higher economic outcomes. But, this difference is only significant for our measure of 
CONTRACTS per capita (Table 9, Sample A).  
The test of the financial development (CONTRACTS) controlled by the economic outcomes (TAX and 
DOORS AND WINDOWS) excluding Seine and Corse also confirms previous results (Table 10, Sample 
A). After having controlled for the wealth of a Department, the CIVIL LAW areas exhibit a higher 
inclination to contract according to the amount of taxes paid on contracts recorded by notaries. This 
figure is significant at the 5 % level. 
 
Do the results remain robust to the effect of the legal frontier? 
We can suspect that our observations of the impact of legal regime on development are biased by 
noisy data. Departments bordering the frontier between civil and customary regimes could suffer 
cross-influence due to the diffusion of both peoples and institutions from the two sides of the 
boarder. We have historical evidence of the diffusion of civil law: seven customs close to the limit of 
customary law country has been influenced by Roman law, especially accepting Roman law when the 
custom is unclear (Chénon, 1929).31 To control for this potential noise in the data, we exclude all the 
Departments bordering the frontier: three Departments of customary law bordering civil law country 
and five Department of civil law bordering customary law country.32 
This sample confirms the previous results. For our three measures of economic performance, the 
CIVIL LAW dummy obtains a positive coefficient which is significant at 5 % level for CONTRATCS per 
capita only. Using TAX and DOORS AND WINDOWS per capita to explain the CONTRACTS per capita, 
the regression on the sample without bordering Departments shows a similar positive and significant 
coefficient.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 It was the case of the customs of Berry, Haute-Marche, Auvergne, Bourbonnais, Bourgogne, Franche-Comté 
and Trois-Evéchés.  
32
 Creuse, Allier, Jura and Dordogne for the custumary area Corrèze, Lozère, Loire and Ain for the civil area. 
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Table 9. Economic outcomes and legal regime controlled by a combination of factors on different samples. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Table 10. Financial development controlled by economic outcomes on two different samples. 
 
P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
 
Conclusion 
This study contributes to the debate on the causes of institutions favorable to economic 
development. Specifically, it provides a unique opportunity test of the very attractive but highly 
discussed law and finance theory. The interest of this new test is to escape the standard empirical 
field, which is the cross-countries comparison. We use the original historical legal division of France: 
the north relying on customary law close to the English common law, and the south under the 
Roman civil law. This dichotomy induces the same difference as the one stressed by legal origin 
theory between current civil law and common law countries. The theoretical mechanisms of 
increased rights given to the state in civil law and more flexibility to judges in customary law are valid 
within the Old Regime France. 
To use the French legal dichotomy provides an escape from most of the difficulties faced by previous 
research analyzing the legal origin theory. Differences in geography, people, technology, genetics and 
age of institutions are very weak within France compared to international comparisons. Our sample 
does not suffer from potential bias due to the conditions of the transplantation of the legal system; 
in contrast, the two legal systems were born in the territory centuries ago. This paper also presents 
the first test of the legal origin theory free of any English influence, neither in terms of culture nor 
Civil Law Rain Rivers Altitude Parliament Km to Km to Adjusted R² F test Obs.
Paris University
TAX 0,0715 -0,0007*** 0,0000 -0,0003** 0,0199 -0,0004** -0,0013** 0,4697 10,6163 79
(0,4325) (0,0000) (0,5749) (0,0162) (0,7658) (0,0439) (0,0538)
CONTRACTS 0,1850** -0,0003* 0,0000 0,0000 0,1511* -0,0007*** -0,0023*** 0,2851 5,3301 79
(0,0858) (0,0653) (0,8996) (0,9455) (0,0561) (0,0038) (0,0036)
DOORS AND WINDOWS 0,0554 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0890 -0,0005** -0,0017** 0,1787 3,3630 79
(0,5496) (0,6081) (0,6953) (0,9471) (0,1917) (0,0220) (0,0140)
TAX 0,1724 -0,0006*** 0,0000 -0,0003** 0,0514 -0,0008*** -0,0025*** 0,5304 12,2935 79
(0,1244) (0,0019) (0,8474) (0,0216) (0,5082) (0,0007) (0,0003)
CONTRACTS 0,3082** -0,0002 0,0000 0,0000 0,1990** -0,0011*** -0,0029*** 0,4352 8,7065 79
(0,0178) (0,2250) (0,4592) (0,7746) (0,0277) (0,0001) (0,0002)
DOORS AND WINDOWS 0,0550 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0798 -0,0005** -0,0009 0,1641 2,9628 79
(0,5796) (0,5475) (0,5231) (0,9842) (0,2514) (0,0268) (0,1134)
Sample A : Wihout Seine and Corse
Sample B : Wihout Départements bordering the frontier
CIVIL TAX DOORS AND Adjusted R² F test Obs.
LAW WINDOWS
CONTRACTS 0,1016** 0,5097*** 0,5638*** 0,7045 61,4007 77
(0,0213) (0,0000) (0,0000)
CONTRACTS 0,1237** 0,6999*** 0,5159*** 0,7580 74,0946 71
(0,0204) (0,0000) (0,0000)
Sample B : Wihout Départements bordering the frontier
Sample A : Wihout Seine and Corse
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Protestantism. Finally, this analysis uses homogeneous measures through a unique fiscal and census 
process.  
In sum, the legal origin theory is not confirmed by the analysis of Old Regime France. People living 
under customary law did benefit from a higher level of development but this difference can be 
explained by other fundamental factors. The difference in favor of the customary area is never robust 
when we control for one of these factors: climate, geography, policy, religion and knowledge. Unlike 
the theory, the civil law regime appears to be associated with higher levels of development after 
having controlled for a combination of other fundamental causes. Even the first prediction of legal 
origin theory, which is a higher level of financial development, is not verified after the control for the 
general level of wealth; for a similar wealth, a French person living under civil law contracts more 
than his counterpart living under customary law. This surprising result could be explained by several 
reasons that undermine the demonstration. But, at least, the main legal origin theory prediction of 
the negative effects of civil law is rejected for Old Regime France. This result constitutes a motivation 
to look for factors determining the quality of institutions other than those of legal origin. 
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